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Crime and Punishment: 
Considering Prison Disciplinary 
Sanctions as Grounds for Departure 
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Madison Peace* 
Abstract 
There are currently over 175,000 federal inmates in the 
United States, 146,000 of whom are held in custody by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons. When an inmate in federal prison 
commits a federal crime, he can be both sanctioned by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and referred to a United States 
Attorney for prosecution of the crime in federal district court. In 
the federal district court, a judge will look to the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines as a starting point to determine an appropriate 
sentence. 
One question that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has not 
addressed, and on which federal appellate courts are divided, is 
whether prison disciplinary sanctions can be used as bases for 
downward departure under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
when inmates are prosecuted in federal courts for crimes they 
committed while incarcerated. This Note will consider that 
question and will then recommend that the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines be explicitly amended to include prison disciplinary 
sanctions as grounds for departure. 
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“If he has a conscience, he will suffer for his mistake. That will 
be punishment—as well as the prison.” 
Fyodor Dostoevsky,  
Crime and Punishment 
I. Introduction 
A. Consider This:  A Federal Sentencing Hypothetical 
Consider the following situation. James is serving a 
three-year sentence in federal prison for selling one hundred 
pounds of marijuana.1 He has been the subject of several 
derogatory remarks from fellow prisoners. One day, a prison 
guard makes an offhand remark that offends James. He loses 
his temper and strikes the guard in the face, giving him a black 
eye. James immediately apologizes to the guard. James’s action 
is considered a “high severity level prohibited act” under federal 
regulations.2 After going through a hearing process in his 
correctional facility, James loses visitation and communication 
privileges for three months and is thus unable to see or speak 
with his young daughter.3 Additionally, he is moved to a 
different housing unit within the prison. Because the incident 
also qualifies as a federal offense,4 the Bureau of Prisons refers 
it to a U.S. Attorney’s Office for potential prosecution.5 The U.S. 
Attorney decides to prosecute James, and James pleads guilty 
to the offense of assault. 
Prior to sentencing, a probation officer calculates the 
appropriate sentencing range for James under the U.S. 
 
 1. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018) (describing the federal offenses of 
distributing controlled and counterfeit substances and the penalties 
associated with such offenses). 
 2. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (2018) (describing acts prohibited within federal 
prisons and the sanctions associated with committing such acts). 
 3. See id. § 541.5 (setting forth the disciplinary process in federal 
prisons). 
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2018) (setting forth the offense of “[a]ssaulting, 
resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees”). 
 5. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. 1350.01, PROGRAM STATEMENT: 
CRIMINAL MATTER REFERRALS (1996) (outlining procedures for “tracking and 
referring matters for prosecution that occur in Bureau of Prisons facilities or 
on Bureau of Prisons property, or involve Bureau of Prisons staff”). 
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Sentencing Guidelines.6 Combining a base offense level of 14 for 
“aggravated assault,”7 the specific offense characteristic of 
causing the guard bodily injury,8 and adjustments based upon 
the fact that the guard was a government employee9 and that 
James accepted responsibility for his action,10 the probation 
officer calculates James’s final offense level at 20.11 Although 
James’s criminal record includes only one other conviction, 
which is for selling marijuana, because James committed the 
instant offense while serving a sentence, he earns two criminal 
history points.12 This places him in Criminal History Category 
II.13 Based upon his offense level (20) and his criminal history 
category (II), the applicable sentencing range for James’s 
offense is thirty-seven to forty-six months.14 The probation 
officer puts this information, along with James’s prison 
disciplinary history, in her report.15 
In federal district court, the judge considers the report but 
then decides to give James a sentence of only nine months, to be 
served consecutively with the sentence he is currently serving. 
The judge states that he is departing from the 
guidelines-recommended sentence, because he believes that the 
 
 6. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41697, HOW THE 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES WORK: AN ABRIDGED OVERVIEW 1 (2015) 
(explaining in detail how the guidelines work). 
 7. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018) (describing the base offense level and specific offense 
characteristics for aggravated assault). 
 8. See id. (listing “bodily injury” as a factor for increasing the offense 
level).  
 9. See id. § 3A1.2 (setting forth the necessary adjustments when the 
victim is an “official victim,” such as a government employee). 
 10. See id. § 3E1.1 (setting forth the necessary adjustments for when a 
defendant accepts responsibility for his offense). 
 11. See § 1B1.1 (providing instructions for applying the guidelines). 
 12. See § 4A1.1 (setting forth the criminal history categories and the 
points associated with them). 
 13. See § 5A (setting forth the sentencing table used to determine the 
applicable sentencing range based upon a defendant’s offense level and 
criminal history category). 
 14. See id. (providing the sentencing ranges “in months of 
imprisonment”).  
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disciplinary sanctions James received from the Bureau of 
Prisons make a guidelines-calculated sentence too harsh. 
There are currently over 175,000 federal inmates in the 
United States, 146,000 of whom are held in Bureau of Prisons 
custody.16 As illustrated above in the hypothetical involving the 
fictional James, when an inmate in federal prison commits a 
federal crime, he can be both sanctioned by the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons and referred to a United States Attorney for 
prosecution of the crime in federal district court.17 In the federal 
district court, a judge will look to the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines as a starting point to determine an appropriate 
sentence.18 
B. Prison Disciplinary Sanctions as Grounds for Downward 
Departure:  An Unresolved Issue 
In October 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform 
Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.19 
With the goal of making the federal sentencing system more 
proportional and consistent, the Sentencing Reform Act 
abolished federal parole for most cases and established the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency of the 
judicial branch.20 Congress tasked the Commission with 
promulgating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to reduce judicial 
discretion in federal courts by providing sentencing policies and 
 
 16. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATISTICS, https://www.bop.gov/about
/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last visited Apr. 30, 2020) (providing 
updated data on the federal inmate population each Thursday) [https://
perma.cc/5QDU-BE6A]. 
 17. See PROGRAM STATEMENT: CRIMINAL MATTER REFERRALS, supra note 5 
(outlining procedures for “tracking and referring matters for prosecution that 
occur in Bureau of Prisons facilities or on Bureau of Prisons property, or 
involve Bureau of Prisons staff”). 
 18. See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines 
work). 
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2018) (setting forth the provisions of the 
Sentencing Reform Act). 
 20. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
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practices based upon empirical data.21 In 1987, the Commission 
published its first guidelines manual.22 The guidelines were 
mandatory and binding on sentencing judges until 2005 when 
the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker23 that an 
application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines violated a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.24 In light of 
the Court’s decision in Booker, the guidelines are now 
“effectively advisory.”25 Even though the sections of the 
Sentencing Reform Act making the guidelines mandatory have 
been severed, the Act still “requires judges to take account of the 
Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.”26 District 
courts must “consult” the guidelines, even though they are “not 
bound to apply” them.27 Sentences that fall within the 
guidelines range, however, may enjoy a presumption of 
reasonableness upon appellate review.28 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allow for courts to exercise 
discretion and depart from the suggested sentencing range 
based upon a number of factors explicitly addressed within the 
guidelines in various places—in commentary and policy 
statements in Chapters Two, Four, and Five.29 The Commission 
has also made it clear that it “does not intend to limit the kinds 
 
 21. Id.  
 22. See id. (noting that the “Commission’s initial guidelines were 
submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987”). 
 23. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment requires “juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to 
sentencing” and severing the provision of the federal sentencing statute 
making the guidelines mandatory). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 259. 
 27. Id. at 264. 
 28. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (concluding that a 
“court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court 
sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines”) 
(emphasis added).  
 29. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 159–60 
(Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2018) (explaining that commentary in Chapter Two 
of the guidelines provides “offense-specific bases for departures,” Chapter Four 
provides grounds for criminal history departures, and policy statements in 
Chapter Five provide “generic bases for departure”). 
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of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the 
[G]uidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure . . . .”30 
One question that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has not 
addressed, and on which federal appellate courts are divided, is 
whether prison disciplinary sanctions can be used as bases for 
downward departure under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
when inmates are prosecuted in federal courts for crimes they 
committed while incarcerated.31 This Note will consider that 
question and will then recommend that the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines be explicitly amended to include prison disciplinary 
sanctions as grounds for departure. 
II. An Overview of Federal Sentencing 
A. The Development of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission and tasked it with promulgating and 
distributing guidelines for federal courts.32 The guidelines were 
developed to create a more effective, fair, honest, uniform, and 
proportional sentencing system that would further the “basic 
purposes of criminal punishment:  deterrence, incapacitation, 
just punishment, and rehabilitation.”33 Under the relevant 
statutory provision, when imposing a criminal sentence, courts 
are to consider seven factors: 
1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; 
2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . ; 
3) the kinds of sentences available; 
4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established 
for—(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the 
 
 30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 31. See id. § 5K (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (listing the grounds for 
departure but not including prison disciplinary sanctions). 
 32. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2018) (describing the duties of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission). 
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applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 
guidelines . . . ; 
5) any pertinent policy statement—(A) issued by the 
Sentencing Commission . . . ; 
6) the need to avoid unwanted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct; and 
7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense.34  
Under what is called the parsimony clause, sentencing 
courts are to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing,]” which 
include promoting respect for the law, providing just 
punishment, deterring criminal conduct, protecting the public, 
and providing the defendant with “needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner . . . .”35 In pursuing this 
end, courts are to look to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which 
set forth categories of offense behavior and characteristics and 
corresponding sentencing ranges.36 
B. How to Calculate a Sentence Under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Federal courts sentence defendants after conviction or 
pursuant to a plea agreement.37 The guidelines are the “starting 
point” for sentencing.38 Generally, before a sentencing hearing, 
a probation officer conducts a presentence investigation and 
prepares a presentence report,39 which includes factual 
 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).  
 35. Id. 
 36. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the statutory mission of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2018) (granting authority to the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to promulgate and distribute sentencing guidelines 
for use in federal criminal cases). 
 37. See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines 
work). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1)(A) (explaining that a presentence 
investigation and report are required unless a statute requires otherwise or 
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information and a guidelines calculation for the court to 
consider.40 The prosecution and defense are both given the 
opportunity to respond to the calculation.41 In determining a 
sentence, the judge takes into account the guidelines range, the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and “other applicable 
statutory demands,” such as mandatory minimum 
requirements.42 The court is to “impose a sentence sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the purposes of 
sentencing.43 
Section 1B1.1 of the guidelines provides general application 
instructions for federal courts.44 The guidelines are to be applied 
in the following way:  First, the probation officer determines 
what guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct)45 of the 
guidelines is “applicable to the offense of conviction.”46 In order 
to do this, she looks to the Statutory Index,47 which lists all the 
federal crime statutes and the corresponding Chapter Two 
sections.48 The applicable Chapter Two section guides the officer 
to determine a Chapter Two offense level by combining the “base 
offense level” with “specific offense characteristics.”49 The officer 
 
the “court finds that the information in the record enables it to meaningfully 
exercise its sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court 
explains its finding on the record”). 
 40. See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines 
work). 
 41. See id. at 6 (noting that both sides “may object to any of [the report’s] 
provisions or omissions”). 
 42. Id. at 1, 6. 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). 
 44. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018) (describing in detail the order in which the provisions of the 
guidelines are to be imposed). 
 45. See id. § 2 (categorizing various offenses). 
 46. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(1). 
 47. See id. at app. A (providing the Statutory Index). 
 48. See id. § 1B1.1(a)(2) (describing the second step in applying the 
guidelines). 
 49. Id. Consider an example relating to the hypothetical at the beginning 
of this note. Section 2A2.2 of the guidelines covers “aggravated assault,” which 
has a Base Offense Level of 14. Id. § 2A2.2. Section 2A2.2 lists several “Specific 
Offense Characteristics.” Id. If the “assault involved more than minimal 
planning,” for example, the probation officer increases the offense level by two 
levels. Id. If the assault resulted in “bodily injury,” the probation officer 
 
  
800 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 791 (2020) 
 
then turns to Chapter Three to consider any adjustments.50 
Adjustments can relate to the victim,51 the defendant’s role in 
the offense,52 obstruction of justice,53 whether the defendant has 
been convicted of multiple counts,54 and whether the defendant 
has accepted responsibility for his actions.55 By combining the 
Chapter Two offense level with the adjustments, the officer 
finds the defendant’s final offense level.56 There are forty-three 
final offense levels.57  
Next, the officer calculates a defendant’s criminal history 
points to determine which of six criminal history categories 
applies to his criminal record.58 Criminal history points are 
assigned based upon prior convictions and whether the 
defendant committed the offense while serving a sentence for 
another offense.59 By looking at the final offense level and 
criminal history category, as well as any applicable departure 
provisions, the probation officer determines the applicable 
 
increases the offense level by three levels, and if it resulted in “serious bodily 
injury,” she increases it by five levels. Id. 
 50. See id. § 1B1.1(a)(3) (describing the third step in applying the 
guidelines). 
 51. See id. § 3A (setting forth “victim-related adjustments,” such as 
“restraint of victim”). 
 52. See id. § 3B (setting forth “role in the offense” adjustments, such as 
“aggravating role” and “mitigating role”). 
 53. See id. § 3C (setting forth “obstruction and related adjustments,” such 
as “reckless endangerment during flight”). 
 54. See id. § 3D (setting forth instructions on adjusting the sentencing 
calculation based upon defendant being convicted of more than one count). 
 55. See id. § 3E (setting forth instructions on adjusting the sentencing 
calculation based upon defendant accepting responsibility for his or her 
offense). 
 56. See id. § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(7) (setting forth all the steps for determining 
the final offense level). 
 57. See id. § 5A (setting forth the sentencing table used to determine the 
applicable sentencing range based upon a defendant’s offense level and 
criminal history category).  
 58. See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines 
work). 
 59. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
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sentencing range from the Sentencing Table.60 The judge is 
required to consider the range presented in the probation 
report.61 
C. Departures and Variances from Guidelines-Recommended 
Sentencing 
When the guidelines were first instituted in 1987, they were 
mandatory, requiring courts to select sentences from guideline 
ranges.62 Now, the guidelines are “effectively advisory,”63 which 
means courts are required to consider the guidelines but are 
allowed to impose a non-guidelines sentence if the judge sees 
fit.64 With a few exceptions, courts may consider “without 
limitation, any information concerning the background, 
character and conduct of the defendant” in deciding whether or 
not to impose a sentence outside the guidelines range.65 Courts 
may impose non-guidelines sentences through both departures 
and variances.66  
A departure is the “imposition of a sentence outside the 
applicable guideline range or of a sentence that is otherwise 
 
 60. See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing how sentences are 
determined). 
 61. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (“So modified, the federal 
sentencing statute . . . requires a sentencing court to consider guidelines 
ranges . . . but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other 
statutory concerns as well.”). 
 62. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018) (explaining how the original guidelines worked). 
 63. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 
38, 49 (2007) (stating that the “Guidelines should be the starting point and the 
initial benchmark” but that they are “not the only consideration”). 
 64. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (“The sentencing 
courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases may depart (either 
pursuant to the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a non-Guidelines 
sentence).”). 
 65. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 66. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 1 
(2018) (describing the general principles by which sentencing courts are to 
abide when considering imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range). 
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different from the guideline sentence . . . .”67 The guidelines 
have always allowed for departures from the prescribed 
sentencing range under certain circumstances.68 A variance, in 
contrast, is the imposition of a sentence outside the guideline 
range based upon the statutory sentencing factors and the 
instruction in 18 U.S.C. § 355369 to “impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply” with the 
purposes of sentencing.70 These purposes include accounting for 
the “seriousness of the offense,” promoting “respect for the law,” 
providing “just punishment,” deterring criminal conduct, 
protecting the “public from further crimes of the defendant,” and 
providing the “defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner.”71 In practice, there is a great deal of 
overlap between the reasons courts give when they grant a 
departure from the guidelines range and those they give when 
they grant a variance from the guidelines range.72 Courts grant 
departures based upon factors the guidelines themselves 
anticipate or because a factor takes the case out of the 
 
 67. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A, n.1(F) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 68. See id. § 1A1.4(b) (explaining the reasons for the Commission’s 
departure policy and the kinds of departures the guidelines allow). 
 69. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (instructing federal courts on how to 
impose sentences). 
 70. Id.; see also PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 66 
(describing the general principles by which sentencing courts are to abide 
when considering imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range). 
 71. § 3553(a). 
 72. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS 
FOR SENTENCES BELOW THE GUIDELINE RANGE WITH BOOKER/18 U.S.C. § 3553 
(2017), https://isb.ussc.gov/api/repos/:USSC:table_xx.xcdf
/generatedContent?table_num=Table25B (last visited Apr. 30, 2020) 
(compiling the reasons for which sentencing courts have stated they are giving 
a sentence below the guidelines range, citing Booker and § 3553 
considerations) [https://perma.cc/6QQT-A8XT]; see also U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURES 
FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE (2017), https://isb.ussc.gov/api/repos/:USSC:table
_xx.xcdf/generatedContent?table_num=Table25 (last visited Apr. 30, 2020) 
(compiling the reasons for which sentencing courts have stated they are 
departing from the guidelines range) [https://perma.cc/H583-6LFE]. 
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“heartland” of cases the guidelines were meant to cover.73 
Variances focus on whether the sentence achieves the goals of 
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.74  
Sentencing in a federal district court is a three-step process. 
First, the court considers the guidelines sentencing range.75 
Then the court considers whether any of the departure 
provisions of the guidelines apply.76 Finally, the court considers 
the §3553(a) factors “as a whole” and determines whether it 
should grant a variance.77 
1. Types of Departures 
There are two types of departure allowed for under the 
guidelines:  departures for which the guidelines “provide specific 
guidance . . . by analogy or by other numerical or non-numerical 
suggestions” and “unguided” departures.78  
 
 73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018); see also United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“A ‘departure’ is typically a change from the final sentencing range 
computed by examining the provisions of the Guidelines themselves.”). 
 74. See PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 66 (describing 
the general principles by which sentencing courts are to abide when 
considering imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range); see also 
REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR SENTENCES BELOW THE GUIDELINE 
RANGE WITH BOOKER/18 U.S.C. § 3553, supra note 72 (compiling the reasons for 
which sentencing courts have stated they are giving a sentence below the 
guidelines range, citing Booker and § 3553 considerations). Top reasons courts 
have given for sentencing below the guideline range under Booker and § 3553 
include “[t]he history and characteristics of the defendant pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),” “[r]eflect seriousness of offense/promotes respect for law
/just punishment,” “[a]fford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “[t]he 
nature and circumstances of the offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),” 
and “[c]riminal history issues.” Id. 
 75. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (instructing courts to “determine the kinds of 
sentences and the guideline range as set forth in the guidelines”). 
 76. See id. § 1B1.1(b) (instructing courts to consider the departure 
provisions in Chapter Five and “any other policy statements or commentary 
in the [G]uidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing a sentence”). 
 77. Id. § 1B1.1(c). 
 78. Id. § 1A1.4(b). 
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The commentary in Chapter Two79 and the policy 
statements of Chapter Four80 of the guidelines cover the first 
type of departure. The policy statements of Chapter Five cover 
the second, more generic type of departure.81 Examples of 
“unguided” departures include the “victim’s conduct,” whether 
“coercion and duress” were involved, a defendant’s “aberrant 
behavior,” whether “extreme psychological injury” was caused, 
whether “property damage or loss” occurred, and “public 
welfare.”82 The list of departures in Chapter Five’s policy 
statements is not exhaustive.83  
After considering the two types of departures—those set out 
in statements in the guidelines themselves and “unguided” 
departures—judges are to look at the sentencing factors set out 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and consider whether issuing a sentence 
within the range suggested by the guidelines achieves the 
purposes of sentencing, keeping in mind the parsimony clause, 
which instructs courts to “impose a sentence that is sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of 
sentencing as set forth in § 3553(a)(2).84 
 
 79. See, e.g., id. § 2A1.1. cmt. n.2(B) (stating that downward departure 
for felony murder may be warranted when defendant did not cause the death 
intentionally or knowingly). 
 80. See, e.g., id. § 4A1.3(b)(1) (“If reliable information indicates that the 
defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the 
seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the 
defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be 
warranted.”). 
 81. See id. § 5K (presenting grounds for departure based upon 
“substantial assistance to the authorities” as well as numerous other grounds 
for departure). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. §1A1.4(b) (“While Chapter Five, Part K, lists factors the 
Commission believes may constitute grounds for departure, the list is not 
exhaustive.”). 
 84. See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and 
variances under the guidelines); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2018) 
(explaining the various needs a sentence might address). The statutory 
provision states that the sentence imposed should “reflect the seriousness of 
the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” “provide just punishment for the 
offense,” “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant,” and “provide the defendant with needed 
educational and vocational training, medical care, and other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.” Id. 
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Departures can be downward or upward.85 A downward 
departure is when the court “effects a sentence less than a 
sentence that could be imposed under the applicable g]uideline 
range or a sentence that is otherwise less than the guideline 
sentence.”86 An upward departure is when the court “effects a 
sentence greater than a sentence that could be imposed under 
the applicable guideline range or a sentence that is otherwise 
greater than the guideline sentence.”87 Grounds for departure 
can be raised by the defense, the prosecution, and the court sua 
sponte.88 There are two special instances in which the 
prosecution must ask for downward departure by raising a 
motion:  when a defendant has provided “substantial assistance 
in the investigation or prosecution of another person”89 and 
when the defendant has participated in an “early disposition” 
program90 that has been authorized by the Attorney General 
and U.S. Attorney in the district in which the defendant resides 
or in which the crime has been committed.91 These types of 
prosecutorial departures occur in approximately a quarter of 
federal cases.92 
2. The Purpose of Departure Provisions 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted a policy allowing 
departure for two reasons.93 First, the Commission recognized 
 
 85. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A, n.1(F) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (defining “departure” as used in the guidelines). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and 
variances under the guidelines). 
 89. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 90. Id. § 5K3.1. 
 91. See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and 
variances under the guidelines); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 (requiring, 
generally, that the government prosecute offenses in the district in which they 
were committed). 
 92. See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and 
variances under the guidelines). 
 93. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (explaining the reasons for the Commission’s 
departure policy and the kinds of departures the guidelines allow). 
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that the guidelines could not capture the “vast range of human 
conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision” and that 
the guidelines could evolve over time to incorporate 
circumstances not originally set forth in them after the 
Commission had the opportunity to analyze courts’ decisions to 
depart.94 Second, the Commission did not believe that courts 
would depart often and trusted that when they did, they would 
do so because the case was “atypical,” one to which a “guideline 
linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs 
from the norm” and in which a “mechanical application of the 
guidelines would fail to achieve the statutory purposes and 
goals of sentencing.”95 While all sentences are considered by 
appellate courts under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion 
standard,”96 appellate courts may give sentences that fall within 
the calculated guidelines range a presumption of 
reasonableness under the Supreme Court’s decision in Rita v. 
United States.97 In that case, the Court explained: 
[T]he presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an 
appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on 
review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing 
Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the 
proper sentence in the particular case. That double 
determination significantly increases the likelihood that the 
sentence is a reasonable one . . . .98 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. § 5, cmt. 5 (explaining the “integral function” departures play). 
 96. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (“[C]ourts of appeals 
must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly 
outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 
standard.”). 
 97. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (holding that the 
law permits courts of appeals to “presume that a sentence imposed within a 
properly calculated United States Sentencing Guidelines range is a reasonable 
sentence”). 
 98. Id. at 347. 
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The Fourth,99 Fifth,100 Sixth,101 Seventh,102 Eighth,103 
Tenth,104 and District of Columbia105 Circuits have adopted the 
presumption of reasonableness allowed by Rita. The First,106 
 
 99. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that district courts have “some latitude to tailor a particular 
sentence to the circumstances” but agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that 
sentences calculated within the guidelines range are “presumptively 
reasonable”). 
 100. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(agreeing with its sister circuits that a “sentence within a properly calculated 
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable”). 
 101. See United States v. Smith, 881 F.3d 954, 960 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating 
that in order for a defendant to show that his sentence was “substantively 
unreasonable,” he would need to “overcome a rebuttable presumption that it 
was reasonable” because it fell within the guidelines range). 
 102. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that post-Booker, the “best way to express the new balance . . . is 
to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly calculated under the 
Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness”).  
 103. See United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a sentence within range for offense and criminal history levels 
was “presumptively reasonable”). 
 104. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(concluding that a “sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines 
is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness” in light of the 
Guidelines purpose to “‘promote uniformity’” (quoting United States v. 
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
 105. See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C.C. 2006) (“We 
agree with our sister circuits that a sentence within a properly calculated 
Guidelines range is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.”). 
 106. See United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 47 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(declining to adopt a presumption of reasonableness “although the Supreme 
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Second,107 Third,108 Ninth,109 and Eleventh110 Circuits have 
declined to adopt the presumption of reasonableness.111 
Although the latter circuits have declined to adopt the 
presumption of reasonableness, “a Guidelines sentence will 
normally not be found unreasonable on appeal.”112 In the fourth 
quarter of 2019, 75.1 percent of sentences fell under the 
guidelines, with 51.5 percent falling within the guideline range 
and 23.6 percent departing upward or downward for reasons 
explicitly set out in the guidelines.113 
Although the majority of sentences fall under the guidelines 
range, under the sentencing statute, courts are permitted to 
depart upward or downward from sentences prescribed by the 
 
 107. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Unlike 
some of our sister circuit courts, we do not presume a Guidelines-range 
sentence is reasonable.”).  
 108. See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 213 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(stating that the court “declined [the] invitation” from the Supreme Court to 
“presume that a within Guidelines sentence is reasonable”). 
 109. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to adopt a presumption of reasonableness while “recogniz[ing] that 
a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence will normally not be found 
unreasonable on appeal”). 
 110. See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 787–88 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(per curium) (rejecting the argument that a Guidelines sentence is per se 
reasonable but stating that “ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the 
Guidelines range to be reasonable”), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 111. See PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 66, at 4 
(compiling all of the previously cited circuit decisions). 
 112. Carty, 520 F.3d at 988. 
 113. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N QUARTERLY 
DATA REP, FOURTH QUARTER RELEASE: PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2019 DATA, 
TABLE 8 (2019). 
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guidelines when they find “an aggravating114 or mitigating115 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
prescribed.”116 Examples of circumstances courts have found not 
adequately considered by the guidelines and grounds for 
downward departure include a defendant’s being subjected to 
severe prison conditions during pre-sentence confinement,117 a 
defendant’s not knowing how pure the methamphetamine he 
distributed was,118 the fact that defendants delivered a large 
quantity of narcotic drugs in small amounts over a substantial 
period of time rather than at once,119 an undocumented 
 
 114. See Aggravating Circumstance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019) (defining an aggravating circumstance). The dictionary provides the 
following two definitions for “aggravating circumstance”: 
1. A fact or situation that increases the degree of liability or 
culpability for a criminal act. 
2. A fact or situation that relates to a criminal offense or defendant 
and that is considered by the court in imposing punishment . . . . 
Id. 
 115. See Mitigating Circumstance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019) (defining a mitigating circumstance). The dictionary provides the 
following two definitions for “mitigating circumstance”:  
1. A fact or situation that does not justify or excuse a wrongful act 
or offense but that reduces the degree of culpability and thus may 
reduce the damages (in a civil case) or the punishment (in a 
criminal case). 
2. A fact or situation that does not bear on the question of a 
defendant’s guilt but that may bear on a court’s possibly lessening 
the severity of its judgment. 
Id. 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018). 
 117. See United States v. Carty, 264 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding 
that the severe prison conditions defendant experienced in the Dominican 
Republic while awaiting extradition could serve as a basis for a downward 
departure). 
 118. See United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(remanding defendant’s case for sentencing because the district court erred in 
concluding that it lacked the power to depart from the guidelines on the basis 
that defendant did not know or have control over how pure the 
methamphetamine was that he was delivering as a middle man). 
 119. See United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming the 
district court’s decision to grant downward departure for defendant based on 
“quantity/time factor” not adequately considered by the guidelines).  
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immigrant serving time in state custody before going into 
federal custody,120 and a defendant’s post-offense 
rehabilitation.121 The Sentencing Commission collects extensive 
data on courts’ departures and variances from guidelines-range 
sentences, organized by circuit, reason, and degree of 
departure.122 
When considering whether a circumstance has been 
adequately considered by the guidelines, courts are to consider 
“only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official 
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.”123 Again, the 
Commission has made clear that in “unusual” cases, it “does not 
intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned 
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds 
for departure.”124 
III. An Overview of Prison Disciplinary Sanctions 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons is responsible for 
disciplining inmates who commit prohibited acts.125 While 
incarcerated, inmates may commit a number of prohibited acts 
that violate both prison regulations and federal law. Such acts 
 
 120. See United States v. Barerra-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 
2004) (holding that it is “permissible for a sentencing court to grant a 
downward departure to an illegal alien for all or part of the time served in 
state custody from the time immigration authorities locate the defendant until 
he is taken into federal custody”). 
 121. See United States v. Chapman, 356 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]ruly exceptional rehabilitation alone can, in rare cases, support a 
downward departure even when the defendant does not accept 
responsibility.”).  
 122. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, https://isb.ussc.gov
/USSC?userid=USSC_Guest&password=USSC_Guest&toc-section=6] (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2020) (tracking the reasons for which courts issue sentences 
outside the guidelines range) [https://perma.cc/Z8CU-92H7?type=image]. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018). 
 124. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 125. See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(3) (2018) (setting forth the “protection, 
instruction, and discipline” of federal inmates as one of the duties of the 
Bureau of Prisons); see also 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018) (setting forth the purpose 
of the Bureau of Prisons’ inmate discipline program). 
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include possessing drugs, assaulting a prison guard, sexually 
assaulting a fellow inmate, attempting escape, and committing 
arson.126 Bureau staff are to administer sanctions in a way that 
is neither capricious nor retaliatory.127 Prohibited acts are 
divided into four levels of severity:  “greatest,” “high,” 
“moderate,” and “low.”128 The sanctions administered for a 
prohibited act depend on its level of severity.129 For example, 
committing a “greatest severity level prohibited act,” such as 
rioting, an inmate could forfeit one hundred percent of his 
earned statutory good time and be subject to disciplinary 
segregation of up to twelve months.130 In contrast, when an 
inmate commits a “high severity level prohibited act,” such as 
fighting with another person, the potential penalties are 
reduced to forfeiting up to fifty percent of earned statutory good 
time and being subject to disciplinary segregation of up to six 
months.131 
When an inmate arrives at a federal prison, he or she is 
given three documents providing notice of the federal prison’s 
inmate discipline program:  a Summary of the Inmate Discipline 
System, Inmate Rights and Responsibilities, and Prohibited 
Acts and Available Sanctions.132 
A. The Disciplinary Process 
The disciplinary process begins when a Bureau staff 
member witnesses or “reasonably believe[s]” that an inmate 
committed a prohibited act.133 The staff member issues an 
 
 126. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–2725 (2018) (setting forth federal 
crimes).  
 127. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018) (setting forth the purpose for the Bureau 
of Prison’s inmate discipline programs).  
 128. Id. § 541.3. 
 129. See id. (outlining different sanctions for the severity level of a 
prohibited act). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  
 132. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. 5270.09, INMATE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM 
(2011) (describing the notice each inmate must receive and stating that receipt 
of the documents must be noted on the intake screening form and kept in the 
inmate’s “central file”).  
 133. 28 C.F.R. § 541.5 (2018). 
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incident report, ordinarily within twenty-four hours.134 Another 
Bureau staff member then investigates the incident.135 Incident 
reports for moderate and low severity prohibited acts may be 
resolved informally.136 If the prohibited act also violates federal 
law, the incident will be referred for prosecution.137 
Once a staff investigation is completed, a Unit Discipline 
Committee (UDC) reviews the incident report, usually within 
five days, and determines if the inmate committed the act 
charged and, if so, whether or not the report will be referred to 
a Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) for further review, 
depending upon offense seriousness.138 Greatest and high 
severity acts are automatically referred to a DHO.139 At the Unit 
Discipline Hearing, the inmate is given the opportunity to 
appear, make a statement, and present evidence upon his 
behalf.140 After the hearing, the UDC will issue any appropriate 
sanctions, except for “loss of good conduct sentence credit, 
disciplinary segregation, or monetary fines,” which the 
Committee does not have the authority to issue.141 An inmate 
gets a written report of the proceedings and also has the right 
to appeal.142 
If the UDC has referred the incident to a DHO or if the 
incident is of “high” or “greatest” severity, then a DHO conducts 
the hearing.143 During a DHO hearing, an inmate is entitled to 
have a staff representative help him.144 The DHO has the power 
to administer any available sanctions, including loss of good 
 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. See PROGRAM STATEMENT: CRIMINAL MATTER REFERRALS, supra note 5 
(outlining procedures for “tracking and referring matters for prosecution that 
occur in Bureau of Prisons facilities or on Bureau of Prisons property, or 
involve Bureau of Prisons staff”). 
 138. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.7 (2018) (explaining how Unit Discipline 
Committee reviews of federal inmate incident reports work). 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. § 541.8 (explaining how Discipline Hearing Officer hearings 
work).  
 144. Id. 
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conduct sentence credit, disciplinary segregation in a special 
housing unit or control unit, and monetary fines.145 After a DHO 
hearing, an inmate receives a written report.146 The inmate may 
also appeal the DHO’s actions.147 
B. Deference Given to Prison Disciplinary Sanctions 
Prison disciplinary sanctions and regulations are generally 
granted deference by courts, as long as they pass constitutional 
muster.148 When a prison regulation “impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.”149 Four factors are 
used to determine the reasonableness of a regulation.150 First, 
there “must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison 
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put 
forward to justify it.”151 Second, a court should consider whether 
there are “alternative means of exercising the right that remain 
open to prison inmates.”152 Third, a court should consider the 
“impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional 
right . . . on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of 
prison resources generally.”153 Lastly, the court should consider 
whether or not there are “ready alternatives.”154 
In addition to challenging the prison regulations 
themselves, inmates may challenge the way the regulations 
 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.   
 148. See Know Your Rights: In Prison-Disciplinary Sanctions and 
Punishment, ACLU, https://acluidaho.org/sites/default/files/wpsite/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/kyr_discipline_punishment_rev_jun10.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2020) [hereinafter Know Your Rights] (providing examples of 
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge 
disciplinary punishment they have received) [https://perma.cc/GPX5-WH9U]. 
 149. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81, 89 (1987).  
 150. Id. at 89. 
 151. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
 152. Id. at 90. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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were imposed in their specific situations.155 However, inmates 
who challenge prison regulations and disciplinary sanctions 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are 
entitled to hearings only when there is a “state-created liberty 
interest in freedom from such punishment” and the punishment 
“imposes an atypical and significant hardship.”156 For example, 
prisoners can challenge loss of good conduct time, but they 
cannot challenge being segregated in a Special Housing Unit, 
being deprived of phone or computer privileges, or being 
transferred to another prison.157 
C. Double Jeopardy Concerns 
It is well established that disciplinary sanctions generally 
do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.158 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects “only 
against successive criminal trials, and a prison disciplinary 
proceeding is not a criminal trial.”159 As then-Judge Sotomayor 
 
 155. See Know Your Rights, supra note 148 (providing examples of 
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge 
disciplinary punishment they have received). 
 156. Id.; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that 
a defendant’s “segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, 
significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty 
interest”). 
 157. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (concluding that 
procedural due process applies even when “liberty itself is a statutory creation 
of the State,” such as in the case of inmates losing good conduct time). 
 158. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see also United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 
1144 (3d Cir. 1993) (“We do not believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause was 
ever intended to inhibit prison discipline.”); United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 
1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[A]dministrative punishment imposed by prison 
officials does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding, criminal in nature, 
violative of the double jeopardy clause.”); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691 
(8th Cir. 1982) (stating that loss of good time credits based on the violation of 
prison disciplinary rules “do not place an offender in jeopardy for the purposes 
of the double jeopardy clause”); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1106 
(3d Cir. 1971) (concluding that the fifteen days defendant spent in segregation 
after being found guilty of possessing a knife-like instrument in prison was 
“not a bar to subsequent prosecution for the crime in a court of competent 
jurisdiction”).  
 159. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, 2 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 10:37 (5th ed. 2018).  
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wrote in a 2005 opinion from the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals: 
The line between civil and criminal sanctions is often hard 
to draw, and this is nowhere more true than in the context of 
prisons, where the punitive character of the environment 
may make even purely regulatory sanctions appear punitive 
in nature. The need to maintain order, however, is a 
legitimate nonpunitive interest if it sometimes requires that 
prison officials take action of a punitive character.160 
Still, it is conceivable that a prison disciplinary sanction 
could raise Double Jeopardy concerns, so the court has set forth 
a test to determine whether Double Jeopardy has been 
violated.161 First, the court is to look at “whether the legislature, 
in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either 
expressly or impliedly a preference” for labeling the mechanism 
as a civil remedy or a criminal penalty.162 Second, the court is to 
look at whether the “statutory scheme is ‘so punitive in either 
purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as 
a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’”163 The court is to 
consider seven factors, first set forth in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez,164 to determine whether a sanction is “penal 
or regulatory in character”165: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether 
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether 
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
 
 160. Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 161. Id. at 145. 
 162. Id. (quotations omitted). 
 163. Id.  
 164. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164–65 (1963) 
(holding that statutes imposing “forfeiture of citizenship” as a punishment for 
Americans who leave or remain outside the United States in order to evade 
military service are unconstitutional). 
 165. Id. at 168. 
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excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned . . . .166 
Although inmates view prison disciplinary sanctions as 
punitive, prison disciplinary sanctions are generally “viewed as 
civil rather than punitive in nature, having the purpose of 
ensuring ‘the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of 
prisons.’”167 One reason for this view is that if prison 
disciplinary sanctions were considered punitive in nature, 
prison officials would be forced to choose between “internal 
discipline and criminal prosecution.”168 As one state court noted: 
Prison officials would be forced to permit conditions inside 
the walls to deteriorate, forgoing security, order, safety, and 
rehabilitation in the hope that violent inmates would be 
brought to trial, convicted, and incarcerated in an institution 
with greater security. Alternatively, the prison officials could 
impose internal disciplinary sanctions . . . . Should such 
action preclude subsequent criminal prosecution, in many 
instances, the interest of society as a whole in punishing 
infractions of criminal law will be left unprotected. We refuse 
to force such a choice on prison officials.169 
IV. Disciplinary Sanctions as Grounds for Departure in 
Sentencing:  The Circuit Split 
The circuit courts are split on whether prison disciplinary 
sanctions—such as revocation of visitation privileges, 
segregation from other prisoners, being denied telephone and 
computer privileges, and loss of good time credits170—can be 
grounds for departure under the sentencing guidelines when an 
inmate is being sentenced for an offense he committed while 
 
 166. Id. at 168–69. 
 167. MUSHLIN, supra note 159 (quoting Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 
146 (2d Cir. 2005)).  
 168. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 479 A.2d 589, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) 
(holding that prison disciplinary sanctions did not violate Double Jeopardy). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Know Your Rights, supra note 148 (providing examples of 
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge 
disciplinary punishment they have received). 
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incarcerated.171 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated 
that prison disciplinary sanctions are not grounds for departure 
under the guidelines.172 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has said that courts may decline to consider disciplinary 
sanctions as grounds for departure in sentencing.173 The Eighth 
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have stated 
that courts may consider prison disciplinary sanctions—in 
particular loss of good time credits174—as grounds for departure 
in sentencing.175 
 
 171. Compare United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Loss of good time credits is not a basis for a downward departure.”), and 
United States v. Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating 
that district court “did not act unreasonably in considering the need to punish 
[defendant’s] federal offense separately from administrative sanctions 
assessed by prison officials”), with United States v. Petersen, 1996 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 30180, at *1, *3 (9th Cir.  Nov. 18, 1996) (stating that district court had 
the “discretion to consider” whether defendant’s losing good time credits took 
“his case outside the ‘heartland’ of ‘typical cases’ contemplated by the 
Commission” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 104 (1996))), and 
United States v. Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that 
district court “did not err in considering the loss of good time as one of the 
aggregate of mitigating factors justifying a downward departure in this case”).  
 172. See Newby, 11 F.3d at 1148. (“Loss of good time credits is not a basis 
for a downward departure.”).  
 173. See Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x at 161 (stating that district court “did 
not act unreasonably in considering the need to punish [defendant’s] federal 
offense separately from administrative sanctions assessed by prison officials”).  
 174. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2018) (stating that prisoners serving a term 
of imprisonment of more than one year may receive up to fifty-four days of 
credit at the end of each year if the Bureau of Prisons determines that the 
“prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary 
regulations”).  
 175. See Petersen, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30180, at *3 (stating that the 
district court had the “discretion to consider” whether defendant’s losing good 
time credits took “his case outside the ‘heartland’ of ‘typical cases’ 
contemplated by the Commission” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 
81, 104 (1996))); see also Whitehorse, 909 F.2d at 320 (stating that district 
court “did not err in considering the loss of good time as one of the aggregate 
of mitigating factors justifying a downward departure in this case”).  
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A. Third Circuit:  United States v. Newby 
In United States v. Newby,176 the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered the appeals of Gene Francis Newby and 
Raynaldo Barber, both of whom were convicted for knowingly 
and willfully impeding and interfering with a federal prison 
guard and one of whom was convicted of assaulting a federal 
prison guard.177 Because they used intoxicants and assaulted 
prison guards in violation of prison regulations, Newby and 
Barber were disciplinarily transferred and segregated and also 
deprived of good time credits—1,000 days for Newby and 
fifty-four for Barber.178 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals first 
considered whether defendants’ loss of good time credits 
constituted “punishment” under the Double Jeopardy Clause 
and concluded that it is well established that prison disciplinary 
sanctions do not invoke Double Jeopardy.179  
The court then considered whether defendants’ loss of good 
time credits was a mitigating factor not addressed by the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines and warranting downward departure.180 
The court acknowledged that the loss of good time credits was 
not explicitly addressed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
 
 176. See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144–48 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that prison disciplinary sanctions do not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause and that they are not basis for a downward departure). 
 177. Id. at 1144. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. at 1146 (“We do not believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
was ever intended to inhibit prison discipline.”); see also United States v. 
Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[A]dministrative punishment 
imposed by prison officials does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding, 
criminal in nature, violative of the double jeopardy clause.”); Kerns v. Parratt, 
672 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that loss of good time credits based 
on the violation of prison disciplinary rules “do not place an offender in 
jeopardy for the purposes of the double jeopardy clause”); United States v. 
Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1106 (3d Cir. 1971) (concluding that the fifteen days 
defendant spent in segregation after being found guilty of possessing a 
knife-like instrument in prison was “not a bar to subsequent prosecution for 
the crime in a court of competent jurisdiction”).  
 180. See Newby, 11 F.3d at 1148 (“A sentencing court has the power to 
depart downward only when it is faced with a mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines.”). 
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but it concluded that a prison disciplinary sanction for loss of 
good time credits was not a mitigating circumstance under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b).181 “The gravamen of a mitigating 
circumstance,” said the court, “is that it somehow reduces the 
defendant’s guilt or culpability.”182 The court reasoned that loss 
of good time credits do not relate to defendants’ guilt and that 
“being sanctioned administratively does not show that 
[defendants] were morally less culpable of the charged crime.”183 
“Loss of good time credits,” the court stated, “is not a basis for a 
downward departure.”184 The court reasoned that granting a 
downward departure because defendants had received prison 
disciplinary sanctions “would defeat the very goals of our 
criminal justice system,” giving defendants a “lesser sentence 
than their respective crimes justly deserve.”185 
A year later, in United States v. Monaco,186 the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals clarified its holding in Newby, stating 
that its “pronouncement on moral culpability . . . must be 
considered dictum”187 in order to reconcile Newby with United 
States v. Gaskill188 and United States v. Lieberman,189 two 
earlier decisions in which the court granted downward 
departures for circumstances that did not lower the defendants’ 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 1148–49. 
 186. See United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 799–801 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that downward departures were permissible on the bases of 
overstatement of criminality by loss tables and anguish over involving adult 
son in fraudulent scheme). 
 187. Id. at 803; see also United States v. Evans, 49 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 
1995) (stating that the “government’s reliance on Newby is misplaced” and 
that a mitigating circumstance does not necessarily need to lessen defendant’s 
guilt). 
 188. See United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that defendant’s responsibility to care for his mentally ill spouse could be 
grounds for a downward departure).  
 189. See United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 998 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that downward departure was appropriate because the prosecution 
had manipulated defendant’s indictment to make it possible to charge him for 
two offenses under the guidelines).  
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culpability.190 “[R]educed moral culpability,” said the court, “is 
not the only permissible basis for a downward departure.”191 
The court’s conclusion in Monaco, however, did not overrule 
Newby.192 Under Monaco, Newby’s holding—that loss of good 
time credits is not a mitigating factor warranting downward 
departure—stands.193 The court focused on Newby’s reasoning 
that good time credits do not warrant downward departure 
because of the different purposes prison disciplinary sanctions 
and criminal sentences serve.194 “[M]erely because a prisoner 
faces the prison’s administrative penalties for rule infractions,” 
said the court, “he cannot thereby accrue a mitigating benefit in 
a criminal sentence flowing from the same act or acts.”195 
B. Fourth Circuit:  United States v. Ortiz-Mercado 
In United States v. Ortiz-Mercado,196 the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals heard the appeal of Heriberto Ortiz-Mercado, 
a North Carolina inmate who pled guilty to possession of 
contraband (a cellular phone, which a guard found in the pocket 
of a pair of his shorts) and was sentenced by the district court to 
two months in prison, to run consecutively with the sentence he 
was serving at the time of the incident.197 On appeal, 
Ortiz-Mercado argued that his sentence was “substantively 
unreasonable,” in part because he had received prison 
disciplinary sanctions from the Bureau of Prisons for possessing 
 
 190. See Monaco, 23 F.3d at 803 (“Thus, to the extent that Newby’s 
pronouncement on moral culpability can be read to implicitly overrule 
decisions such as Gaskill and Lieberman, the Newby language must be 
considered dictum.”). 
 191. Id. at 802. 
 192. See id. at 802–03 (distinguishing Monaco from Newby).  
 193. See id. (explaining that the court’s holding in Newby must be read in 
harmony with the courts’ decisions in Gaskill and Lieberman).  
 194. See id. at 802 (“We held [in Newby] that because criminal sentences 
and disciplinary sanctions are designed to serve different purposes, such a 
departure would defeat the goals of the criminal justice system by giving 
incarcerated defendants lesser sentences than they deserved.”).  
 195. Id.  
 196. United States v. Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that defendant’s sentence was substantively reasonable). 
 197. Id.  
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the contraband.198 As a result of having a prohibited object, 
Ortiz-Mercado lost good time credits, telephone privileges for 
eighteen months, and commissary privileges for twelve 
months.199 In addition, Ortiz-Mercado was placed in solitary 
confinement for eight months.200 The Court concluded that the 
district court “did not act unreasonably in considering the need 
to punish Ortiz-Mercado’s federal offense separately from 
administrative sanctions assessed by prison officials” but did 
not explicitly say that prison disciplinary sanctions could never 
be considered as grounds for downward departure.201 
C. Eighth Circuit:  United States v. Whitehorse 
In United States v. Whitehorse,202 the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals heard the appeal of Karen Jane Whitehorse, a North 
Dakota inmate serving a three-year sentence on an assault 
conviction.203 While serving her sentence, Whitehorse, an 
alcoholic, was granted a seven-day furlough to visit relatives.204 
Instead of visiting her relatives, she spent the week’s furlough 
intoxicated and then did not have enough money to return to 
her correctional center at the appointed time.205 She did, 
however, call the correctional center and tell them about the 
situation.206 The Bureau of Prisons extended her furlough, and 
she still failed to appear.207 She was arrested and charged with 
escape.208 
 
 198. Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x 
160 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-4661). 
 199. Id. at 6–7.  
 200. Id. at 7. 
 201. Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x at 161.  
 202. See United States v. Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the district court properly considered defendant’s loss of good 
time as a mitigating circumstance and that the “totality of the mitigating 
factors” the district court considered “warranted downward departure”). 
 203. Id. at 317–18. 
 204. Id. at 317. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. 
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The district court departed from the 
guidelines-recommended range of twelve to eighteen months, to 
be served consecutively, and sentenced Whitehorse to a 
four-month sentence, which she could serve concurrently with 
the three-year sentence she was already serving.209 On appeal 
from the government, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reviewed whether there were mitigating circumstances 
inadequately considered by the guidelines warranting 
departure in Whitehorse’s case and whether the district court 
abused its discretion in imposing a four-month sentence.210 The 
Court found that there were mitigating factors—one of which 
was Whitehorse’s loss of two months of good conduct time—that 
warranted downward departure.211 The court stated:  “We hold 
that the District Court did not err in considering the loss of good 
time as one of the aggregate of mitigating factors justifying a 
downward departure in this case.”212 
D. Ninth Circuit:  United States v. Petersen 
In United States v. Petersen,213 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals heard the appeal of Donald W. Petersen, an inmate who 
sent a “barrage of threatening letters” to two of his former 
college professors, one of whom was the victim of the assault for 
which Petersen was serving a seventy-five-month sentence.214 
The state Department of Corrections sanctioned him with the 
loss of 360 days of good time credits, and Petersen was also 
charged by the federal government with two counts of mailing 
threatening letters.215 The district court that initially heard 
Petersen’s case held that it did not have “discretion to consider 
[Petersen’s] loss of good time credits . . . as bases for departing 
 
 209. Id.   
 210. Id. at 318.  
 211. Id. at 319–20. 
 212. Id. at 320. 
 213. See United States v. Petersen, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30180, at *1, *4 
(9th Cir. Nov. 18, 1996) (holding that the district court had discretion to 
consider whether defendant’s loss of good time credits took his case out of the 
“heartland” of cases and were therefore grounds for a downward departure). 
 214. Id. at *2.  
 215. Id.   
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from the Sentencing Guidelines.”216 After the district court’s 
ruling, however, the Supreme Court held in Koon v. United 
States217 that district courts have the discretion to consider any 
factors not “categorically proscribed by the Sentencing 
Commission” as bases for departure.218 Because good time 
credits had not been addressed by the Sentencing Commission, 
the Court of Appeals held that the district court that considered 
Petersen’s case had the discretion to consider whether the loss 
of good time credits took Petersen’s case “outside the ‘heartland’ 
of ‘typical’ cases contemplated by the Commission.”219 
V. Why the Third Circuit Court of Appeals Got It Wrong          
in Newby 
As stated above, there are two types of departure allowed 
for under the guidelines:  departures for which the guidelines 
“provide specific guidance . . . by analogy or by other numerical 
or non-numerical suggestions” and “unguided” departures.220 It 
is clear that prison disciplinary sanctions have not been 
explicitly covered by the guidelines, nor have related terms such 
as “administrative sanctions” and “good time credits.”221 The 
question on which the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits 
disagree is whether prison disciplinary sanctions can be 
considered as grounds for departure under the second type of 
 
 216. Id.  
 217. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996) (concluding that 
whether a factor can be an appropriate basis for departure is “limited to 
determining whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, 
consideration of the factor” and whether the factor “takes the case outside the 
heartland of the applicable Guideline”), superseded by the Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003 (PROTECT Act). The PROTECT Act changed the standard of review 
appellate courts apply to district courts’ departure decisions from “abuse of 
discretion” to de novo for violent crimes involving children. 
 218. Petersen, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30180, at *3.  
 219. Id. at *4 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 92–99).  
 220. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 221. See generally id. (showing neither “good time credits” nor 
“administrative sanctions” nor “prison disciplinary sanctions” when the terms 
were searched in the guidelines).  
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departures—“unguided” departures.222 The Third Circuit in 
Newby said that prison disciplinary sanctions, such as the loss 
of good time credits, could not be considered as an “unguided” 
departure.223 Acknowledging that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) allows for 
departure when a court “finds that there exists an aggravating 
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission,”224 the Third Circuit concluded that prison 
disciplinary sanctions could not be such a mitigating 
circumstance because of the “different purposes that the 
disciplinary sanctions and criminal sentences are designed 
serve . . . .”225 “[G]ranting a downward departure to compensate 
for the defendants’ loss of good time credits,” said the court, 
“would defeat the very goals of our criminal justice system.”226 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Newby got it wrong. 
The statutory provision instructing courts on how to apply the 
guidelines gives courts broad discretion to depart from 
guideline-specific sentences when they find “an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 
different from that described.”227 The guidelines are clear that 
they are meant to create a “heartland” of cases, a “set of typical 
cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.”228 
With a few exceptions, the Commission says that it “does not 
intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned 
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds 
for departure in an unusual case.”229 The factors that cannot be 
considered include “race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, 
 
 222. See cases cited supra note 171. 
 223. See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Loss 
of good time credits is not a basis for a downward departure.”). 
 224. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018). 
 225. Newby, 11 F.3d at 1148. 
 226. Id. 
 227. § 3553(b)(1). 
 228. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 229. Id.  
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and socio-economic status,”230 “lack of guidance as a youth and 
similar circumstances,”231 “drug or alcohol dependence or abuse” 
(ordinarily),232 and “personal financial difficulties and economic 
pressures upon a trade or business.”233 
Even though prison disciplinary sanctions and criminal 
sentences serve different purposes, it may be appropriate in 
some cases for judges to consider prison disciplinary sanctions—
particularly severe sanctions, such as solitary confinement and 
loss of a large amount of good conduct time—as grounds for 
downward departure. Beyond the above-listed exceptions, the 
Commission has been clear that it “does not intend to limit the 
kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the 
guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an 
unusual case.” 234 The Sentencing Commission tracks the 
reasons courts list for departing from the guidelines, and the 
reasons are myriad.235 In FY2017, for example, courts cited the 
following reasons for departing from the guidelines:  family ties 
and responsibilities, age, physical condition, time served, 
cultural assimilation, low likelihood of recidivism, charitable 
conduct and good works, military record, crack/powder 
disparity, and sufficient punishment.236 Although it may be 
unlikely for judges to depart from the guidelines on the basis of 
a defendant’s receiving prison disciplinary sanctions, given the 
deference these sanctions are usually afforded237 and the fact 
 
 230. Id. § 5H1.10.  
 231. Id. § 5H1.12.  
 232. Id. § 5H1.4. 
 233. Id. § 5K2.12.  
 234. Id. §1A1.4(b). 
 235. See INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS:  
DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 122 (tracking the reasons for which 
courts issue sentences outside the guidelines range). 
 236. See REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD 
DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE, supra note 72 (compiling the reasons 
for which sentencing courts have stated they are departing from the guidelines 
range). 
 237. See Know Your Rights, supra note 148 (providing examples of 
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge 
disciplinary punishment they have received). 
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that they are not mentioned in the guidelines,238 there is no 
reason that a court could not consider prison disciplinary 
sanctions as a possible grounds for departure. 
VI. Whether Courts Should Consider Prison Disciplinary 
Sanctions as Grounds for Downward Departure:  A Policy 
Analysis 
Courts may consider prison disciplinary sanctions as 
grounds for downward departure under the guidelines.239 But 
should they? This Part will consider the reasons for and against 
judges’ departing downward from the guidelines because an 
inmate has received prison disciplinary sanctions. It will then 
recommend that the guidelines be explicitly amended to 
“provide specific guidance” to courts for departing downward on 
the basis of prison disciplinary sanctions, given the circuit split. 
Lastly, it will provide an overview of the guidelines’ amendment 
process. 
A. Reasons Against Prison Disciplinary Sanctions Being Used 
as Grounds for Downward Departure 
While courts can consider prison disciplinary sanctions as 
grounds for departure (as well as grounds for variance), there 
are a number of reasons they may decline to do so. As the court 
in Newby noted, prison disciplinary sanctions serve a different 
purpose than sentences.240 Sentences are meant to 
 
 238. See generally, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (showing neither “good time credits” nor 
“administrative sanctions” nor “prison disciplinary sanctions” when the terms 
were searched in the guidelines).  
 239. See id. § 1A1.4(b) (stating “[w]ith those specific exceptions, however, 
the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not 
mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for 
departure in an unusual case” and not listing “disciplinary sanctions” as an 
exception).  
 240. See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148 (1993) (“Because of 
the different purposes that the disciplinary sanctions and criminal sentences 
are designed to serve, we think that granting a downward departure to 
compensate for the defendants’ loss of good time credits would defeat the very 
goals of our criminal justice system.”). 
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(a) reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (b) 
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (c) to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(d) to provide the defendant with needed educational and 
vocational training, medical care, and other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner . . . .241 
In contrast, prison disciplinary sanctions are meant to 
“ensure the safety, security, and orderly operation of 
correctional facilities, and the protection of the public . . . .”242 A 
sentence is punitive in nature, whereas a prison disciplinary 
sanction is primarily administrative. 
When an inmate commits a crime in prison, he has notice 
that he will be subject to both types of sanctions, and his actions 
may merit both types of sanctions.243 The sentencing guidelines 
state that “a defendant with a prior criminal record is more 
culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater 
punishment.”244 The guidelines instruct that two points should 
be added to a defendant’s criminal history category when the 
defendant “committed the instant offense while under any 
criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, 
supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape 
status.”245 The guidelines take it seriously when an inmate has 
committed an additional offense while serving time for a 
previously committed offense.246 If an inmate is indeed “more 
culpable,” it makes sense that he would receive both prison 
disciplinary sanctions for committing an act prohibited by the 
prison and also receive a criminal sentence.247 
 
 241. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2018). 
 242. 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018).  
 243. See INMATE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM, supra note 132 (describing the 
notice each inmate must receive and stating that receipt of the documents 
must be noted on the intake screening form and kept in the inmate’s “central 
file”); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–2725 (2018) (setting forth federal crimes). 
 244. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018) (emphasis added). 
 245. Id. § 4A1.1(d). 
 246. See id. (specifying that two points should be added).  
 247. See id. at pt. A, introductory cmt. (“A defendant with a record of prior 
criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of 
greater punishment.”).  
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On a practical level, if judges begin to depart based upon 
prison disciplinary sanctions, it may lead them to begin 
departing for other non-criminal sanctions administered by the 
state or federal government, too, for example, sex offender 
registration.248 Lastly, if judges begin to frequently depart 
because of prison disciplinary sanctions, the Bureau of Prisons 
could simply decide to discipline inmates after the court 
sentences them in order to avoid the issue, as the timeline for 
the prison disciplinary process is malleable. While the Bureau 
of Prisons would likely not do this with sanctions that ensure 
the “orderly operation of correctional facilities,” it is possible 
that they would do so with sanctions such as loss of good time 
conduct.249 
B. Reasons for Prison Disciplinary Sanctions Being Used as 
Grounds for Downward Departure 
The guidelines instruct that the Commission “does not 
intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned 
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds 
for departure.”250 Courts are also required under 18 U.S.C. § 
3553 to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing].”251 
While the guidelines were instituted in order to make the 
federal sentencing system more proportional and consistent,252 
they are also meant to provide “sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or 
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment 
of general sentencing practices.”253 
 
 248. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 20912 (2018) (stating that “[e]ach jurisdiction 
shall maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry” and “[t]he Attorney 
General shall issue guidelines and regulations”).  
 249. 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018).  
 250. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018) (explaining the reasons for the Commission’s departure policy 
and the kinds of departures to which the guidelines refer). 
 251. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 252. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the statutory mission of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission). 
 253. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018). 
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Given the different purposes of prison disciplinary 
sanctions and criminal sentences, it is unlikely that judges will 
frequently depart from the guidelines based upon prison 
disciplinary sanctions.254 When judges see fit to depart based 
upon prison disciplinary sanctions, however, they should do so, 
as they are to do justice on a case-by-case basis, even under the 
guidelines.255 Achieving “equal justice across cases” and 
“individual justice in specific cases” is a difficult task, 
however.256 Critics of the guidelines put it this way: 
By replacing the case-by-case exercise of human judgment 
with a mechanical calculus, we do not judge better or more 
objectively, nor do we judge worse. Instead we cease to judge 
at all. We process individuals according to a variety of 
purportedly objective criteria. But genuine judgment, in the 
sense of moral reckoning, cannot be inscribed in a table of 
offense levels and criminal history categories . . . . In place of 
moral judgment, the Guidelines have substituted 
bureaucratic penalization.257 
In some cases, such as the hypothetical case of James at the 
beginning of the Note, a judge may find that justice requires 
downward departure because the defendant has received prison 
disciplinary sanctions.258 Being able to depart on this basis gives 
the judge the opportunity to do individual justice. Further, 
granting downward departures on the basis of prison 
 
 254. See REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD 
DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE, supra note 72 (indicating that in 
FY2017, no sentencing courts cited prison disciplinary sanctions as a reason 
for downward departure).  
 255. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (stating that the guidelines are to 
“provide certainty and fairness” while also “maintaining sufficient flexibility 
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or 
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general 
sentencing practices”). 
 256. See Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1253–54 (1997) (discussing the 
unintended consequences of the federal sentencing guidelines). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. at 1263 (warning that by eliminating the power of judges to 
consider the circumstances of a crime and the defendant in their entirety “the 
Guidelines threaten to transform the venerable ritual of sentencing into a 
puppet theater in which defendants are not persons, but kinds of persons”).  
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disciplinary sanctions is consistent with many of the other 
reasons judges have given for granting downward departure in 
order to do individual justice, such as “rehabilitation,” 
“convictions on related counts,” “totality of 
circumstances/combination of factors,” “sufficient punishment,” 
and the fact that the defendant is “currently receiving 
punishment under state or federal jurisdiction.”259 
It is well established that prison disciplinary sanctions do 
not invoke Double Jeopardy concerns.260 While that is true, a 
defendant’s receiving prison disciplinary sanctions and a 
criminal sentence may sometimes invoke some of the same 
philosophical concerns as Double Jeopardy, i.e., that a person 
should not be punished twice. As then-Judge Sotomayor wrote:  
“The line between civil and criminal sanctions is often hard to 
draw, and this is nowhere more true than in the context of 
prisons, where the punitive character of the environment may 
make even purely regulatory sanctions appear punitive in 
nature.”261 While prison disciplinary sanctions do not invoke 
Double Jeopardy concerns, there are likely situations in which 
disciplinary sanctions are so punitive (i.e., solitary confinement 
or loss of an exorbitant amount of good conduct time) that what 
the defendant actually experiences is double punishment. 
Further, the guidelines add criminal history points when the 
defendant “committed the instant offense while under any 
 
 259. REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURES 
FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE, supra note 72. 
 260. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“We do not believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause was ever 
intended to inhibit prison discipline.”); United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 
1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Administrative punishment imposed by prison officials 
does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding, criminal in nature, violative 
of the double jeopardy clause.”); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 
1982) (stating that loss of good time credits based on the violation of prison 
disciplinary rules “do not place an offender in jeopardy for the purposes of the 
double jeopardy clause”); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1106 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (concluding that the fifteen days defendant spent in segregation 
after being found guilty of possessing a knife-like instrument in prison was 
“not a bar to subsequent prosecution for the crime in a court of competent 
jurisdiction”). 
 261. Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, 
supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape 
status,” which is, in a way, an additional punitive measure.262 
Allowing judges to depart from the guidelines on the basis of 
prison disciplinary sanctions will allow them to soften an 
unusually harsh prison disciplinary sanction when merited. 
Under § 3553, sentencing courts are instructed to consider 
the “need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness 
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense,” as well as the need “to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”263 It is possible that 
the prison disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Bureau of 
Prisons have satisfied these purposes and that if a departure is 
not warranted, a variance under § 3553 would be. 
C. The Guidelines’ Amendment Process 
From the very beginning, the guidelines were meant to be 
“evolutionary.”264 When it first published the guidelines, the 
Commission stated: 
The initial sentencing guidelines and policy statements were 
developed after extensive hearings, deliberation, and 
consideration of substantial public comment. The 
Commission emphasizes, however, that it views the 
Guideline-writing process as evolutionary. It expects, and 
the governing statute anticipates, that continuing research, 
experience, and analysis will result in modifications and 
revisions to the [G]uidelines through submission of 
amendments to Congress. To this end, the Commission is 
established as a permanent agency to monitor sentencing 
practices in the federal courts.265 
 
 262. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(d) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 263. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). 
 264. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the statutory 
mission of the U.S. Sentencing Commission). 
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The guidelines evolve by way of amendments, based upon 
“congressional action, decisions from courts of appeals, 
sentencing-related research, and input from the criminal justice 
community.”266 The Commission amends the guidelines 
annually.267 Each summer, the Commission publishes a notice 
of proposed priorities in the Federal Register and makes a 
request for public comment.268 In the fall, the Commission 
finalizes its priorities.269 Generally in December or January, the 
Commission publishes its proposed amendments in the Federal 
Register and, again, requests public comment and hosts public 
hearings.270 By the first day of May, “at or after the beginning 
of a regular session of Congress,” the Commission submits its 
proposed amendments to Congress, along with a statement of 
reasons and proposed dates of effect for the amendments.271 A 
date of effect must be at least 180 days after the amendment 
was submitted—to give Congress time to disapprove or modify 
the amendment if it chooses to do so—but before November 1.272 
Generally, amendments take effect on November 1.273 A new 
 
 266. See Amendments to the Guidelines Manual, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, 
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendments (last visited Apr. 30, 2020) 
(archiving the yearly amendments and guidelines manuals dating back to 
1987) [https://perma.cc/8KEA-J9B4]. 
 267. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2018) (setting forth amending the guidelines 
as one of the duties of the Commission and explaining the process). 
 268. See Policymaking, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov
/policymaking (last visited Apr. 30, 2020) (providing an overview of the 
amendment process) [https://perma.cc/62PW-GMVK]. 
 269. See id. (providing a general timeline of the commission’s 
policymaking process in which proposals are finalized from September to 
December).  
 270. See Policymaking, supra note 268 (“Typically in January (but 
sometimes earlier) the Commission publishes proposed amendments 
responding to its list of priorities.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (setting forth 
the procedures for agency rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures 
Act). 
 271. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2018). 
 272. See id. (detailing the timeline for submitting amendments to the 
guidelines).  
 273. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, r. 
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manual is published each time the guidelines are amended.274 
Since they were first published in 1987, the Sentencing 
Commission has passed over 800 amendments to the 
guidelines.275 
One of the final priorities for the last amendment cycle—
which ended on May 1, 2019—was “resolution of circuit conflicts 
as warranted, pursuant to the Commission’s authority under 28 
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)276 and Braxton v. United States,277 500 
U.S. 334 (1991).”278 The statutory provision instructs that one of 
the purposes of the Commission is to 
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of 
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when 
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken 
into account in the establishment of general sentencing 
practices.279 
In Braxton, the Court considered whether it is the duty of 
the Supreme Court or the Sentencing Commission to resolve 
conflicts between federal courts regarding the meaning of 
provisions in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.280 The Court 
explained that while one of the Court’s principal purposes is to 
 
 274. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2018) (setting forth amending the guidelines 
as one of the duties of the Commission and explaining the process). 
 275. See Policymaking, supra note 268 (providing an overview of the 
amendment process). 
 276. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018) (describing the characteristics of 
the “sentencing policies and practices” the U.S. Sentencing Commission are to 
implement). 
 277. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1991) (declining 
to resolve question relating to circuit conflict because the “[U.S. Sentencing] 
Commission has already undertaken a proceeding that will eliminate circuit 
conflict” and because the controversy could be decided upon other grounds). 
 278. Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle for United States Sentencing 
Commission, 83 Fed. Reg. 30,477 (June 28, 2018). 
 279. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018). 
 280. See Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348–49 (declining to resolve question 
relating to circuit conflict because the “[U.S. Sentencing] Commission has 
already undertaken a proceeding that will eliminate circuit conflict” and 
because the controversy could be decided upon other grounds). 
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“resolve conflicts among the United States courts of appeals and 
state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal 
law,” Congress and agencies also share that duty, as they can 
clarify statutory provisions and regulations.281 In respect to the 
guidelines, the Court stated that by charging the Commission 
to “periodically review and revise” the guidelines, “Congress 
necessarily contemplated that the Commission would 
periodically review the work of the courts, and would make 
whatever clarifying revisions to the guidelines conflicting 
judicial decisions might suggest.”282 
In the last cycle of proposed amendments, one of the 
amendments related to a circuit conflict regarding the 
application of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) and whether under that 
provision courts can “reduce a sentence below the amended 
guideline range to reflect departures other than substantial 
assistance that the defendant received at his original sentencing 
or whether any sentence reduction may reflect only the 
departure amount attributable to substantial assistance.”283 
Reviewing the work of the courts is one of the duties of the 
Commission.284 It would be appropriate for the Commission to 
review the circuit conflict over whether prison disciplinary 
sanctions can be grounds for downward departure. 
VII. Conclusion 
Given the conflict between the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals,285 the guidelines should be amended to “provide 
specific guidance”286 to courts about departing downward on the 
basis of prison disciplinary sanctions. Amending the guidelines 
 
 281. Id. at 347. 
 282. Id. at 348 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)).  
 283. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2018). 
 284. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1991) (“Congress 
necessarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the 
work of the courts, and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the 
[G]uidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.”). 
 285. See cases cited supra note 171.  
 286. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018).  
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would provide clear guidance to federal inmates, Bureau of 
Prisons staff, courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. As 
prosecuting or defending federal inmates for the federal crimes 
they commit in prison is not a significant part of any attorney’s 
practice, this kind of certainty and consistency would be helpful. 
It would, for example, make it easier for prosecutors and defense 
attorneys to negotiate plea agreements, as they would know 
more fully what factors the federal district judge is considering 
in sentencing. Take, for example, the case of James, told at the 
beginning of this Note. If the U.S. Attorney prosecuting that 
case had known that the judge might depart based upon James’s 
prison disciplinary sanctions, he could have negotiated James’s 
plea agreement accordingly. If James’s defense attorney had 
known that the judge might consider prison disciplinary 
sanctions, he could have used it to his advantage in the 
negotiating process, as well. If James had not plead guilty and 
had gone to trial instead, his defense attorney could have made 
the case for the prison disciplinary sanctions being grounds for 
departure. The U.S. Sentencing Commission can provide clear 
guidance in this area over which the circuits are conflicted—and 
it should. 
